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ABSTRACT
The research reported in this paper introduces new techniques to aid in the
identification of recovered notebook computers so they may be returned to the
rightful owner. We identify non-volatile data storage areas as a means of
facilitating the safe storing of computer identification information. A forensic
proof of concept tool has been designed to test the feasibility of several storage
locations identified within this work to hold the data needed to uniquely
identify a computer. The tool was used to perform the creation and extraction
of created information in order to allow the analysis of the non-volatile storage
locations as valid storage areas capable of holding and preserving the data
created within them. While the format of the information used to identify the
machine itself is important, this research only discusses the insertion, storage
and ability to retain such information.
Keywords: unique identification; non-volatile storage areas; BIOS; MBR;
notebook identification; digital evidence; forensic computing.
1. INTRODUCTION
Notebook theft has become a major international issue. Once a notebook
computer is stolen, the affected user often does not know how to identify
his/her notebook computer. They are usually only able to describe the colour
and markings on the notebook computer for identification purposes. As the
number of notebook computers sold increases, so does the number of stolen
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notebook computers, and as the number of identical notebook computer models
multiplies, the recovery process is made more complex. Governing bodies,
such as the police, lack the standards and tools to be able to uniquely identify a
notebook computer, leaving little chance of establishing a link between a
recovered notebook computer and its owner. Commercial tools, available for
notebook computer protection, include prevention from unauthorised access or
data protection through encryption; these however do not address the issue of
uniquely identifying a notebook computer in case of theft.
There is little ability to rely on physical serial numbers as a means of
identification since, anecdotally, the first task a criminal undertakes is that of
removing and swapping hard disk and CD/ DVD drives and replacing with
alternative stolen parts; hardware components are exchanged to remove
standard means of identification, making the identification of the notebook
computer difficult. Stolen notebook computers are often reformatted and this
reduces the likelihood of identifying them. Due to this problem, it has become
necessary to identify locations, and means, by which a notebook computer can
be uniquely identified to increase the rate of linking of a notebook computer to
its owner.
The identification of recovered stolen notebook computers is hindered by the
lack of permanent identifiable markers. Being able to provide a location for a
permanent marker would increase the rate of identification of notebook
computers to their original owners. By marking the locations at which the
markers would be stored, in a forensically sound manner, law enforcement
would also be able to use the evidence in the court of law to not only
apprehend and convict but possibly also discourage future thefts of notebook
computers.
This research focuses on the identification of a notebook computer that was
previously stolen and later recovered by law enforcement agencies. The
problem faced by law enforcement is two fold. Firstly the investigators
looking to identify these machines are often not computer experts and,
secondly, the number of notebook computers that are recovered without
distinguishing features is increasing, and looking through each machine trying
to find information about the actual owner of the machine is a tedious and time
consuming task. In order to facilitate a more streamlined, forensically sound,
more user-friendly and faster approach to matching a notebook computer with
its owner, a proof-of-concept tool needed to be designed. This tool would be
able to uniquely identify a notebook computer and store this unique
information somewhere on the notebook computer. The location of this
information would need to remain both secure and unchanged even after
hardware removal or formatting of the hard disks. We make the assumption
that that the primary disk drive is formatted using NTFS.
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2. FORENSIC COMPUTING RESEARCH AND RECOVERY OF
MOBILE DEVICES
There are several expanding areas of research in forensic computing. The term
mobile no longer applies to the telephone alone; new technologies have
emerged on the market, including mobile phones, PDAs and notebook
computers. Armstrong et al (2004) report on the CSI/FBI survey conducted in
2003, and compares the results with Australian statistics, which showing the
serious problem of notebook computer recovery not only in America but world
wide. In the state of NSW, Australia, 10,000 notebook computers were stolen,
and only 336 were recovered, making computer theft a serious problem
(Armstrong, Wynne & O'Shea 2004). Looking more closely at the figures in
the CSI/FBI survey it shows that around a third of interviewed participants
have experienced notebook computer theft with financial losses of around $11
million (DeMaria 2002). Armstrong et al (2004) stress the lack of security
implementations on such machines and the need for tools to aid in recovery of
these machines (Armstrong, Wynne & O'Shea 2004). In order to increase the
percentage of notebook computer recovery, a new system needs to be devised.
Recovery can be understood as the confiscation of a machine from the
suspected thief and the returning of the machine to its owner. This research
focuses on the later interpretation.
To effectively recover a notebook computer there needs to be a means of
identifying a notebook computer. This research looks to place an identifier
somewhere on the machine itself. Though it is not part of this research, it is
important to consider what type of information needs to be stored in the
identifier. There have been several concepts proposed on what should be
placed in an identifier that would potentially identify one notebook computer
over another. Before looking at what it needs to contain it is important to state
that the nonvolatile memories are limited in unallocated space. Bursky (2003)
suggests that improvements are “on the way” with Hitachi demonstrating a
working 1GB flash memory chip solving the restriction on available space
(Bursky 2003). As this technology is unlikely to be deployed and mass
distributed in general purpose machine in the near future, the research will
regard the limitations of available space as a valid restriction. Examining the
literature different authors suggest diverse information for the identifier, but
one paper of interest suggests 15 different key identifiers that could be
collected in order to sufficiently identify the notebook computer (Slay et al.
2004). Information such as serial numbers, model numbers, type of notebook
computer, processor speed, types of hardware contained on the notebook
computer, the date purchased, the time zones and so forth are all mentioned as
possible identifiers. This information in general is good enough to identify a
machine; a problem with this type of identifier is that it would be hard if not
impossible to collect all of them with software alone. The reason for this is that
if the tools should remain simple to use without user interaction the serial
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numbers that are not accessible with software would not be retrievable. Should
the choice be made to allow user interaction with the tool, then information
such as the users name and contact details could be also collected as suggested
in the paper by (Slay et al. 2004). Such information needs to be stored on the
machine in a manner that would allow the information to remain on the
notebook computer even after reformats and removal of peripherals.
3. REVIEW OF EXISTING TOOLS AND APPLICATIONS
There have been several attempts at addressing the issues of notebook
computer security. Each of these applications addresses one or two parts of the
problem. Firstly some of the applications look to address data theft, as often
trade and government secrets could be stored on these machines. The tools
described below all address data security through different means of either
encrypting or installing kill switches that just wipes all the data on the
machine.

3.1 Beachhead Solutions – Mobile Data Vulnerability (Beachhead
2006) and PointSec – PointSec Laptop(PointSec 2006)
This application is a software based implementation installed on the target
notebook computer. It employs a multilayered approach to data security by
applying both encryption and user’s behaviour to detect possible unauthorised
access to the data. This as a result would initiate a wiping action that can either
delete some sections of the hard disk or the complete hard disk. This can be
done both with the machine online or offline. This tool is only of use if the
person is not concerned with the cost involved when losing a notebook
computer but rather with what data is stored on it. It fails to address the
identification process all tougher.
It is important for corporations to keep track of these machines to reduce the
cost of data being compromised. The tools listed below are all designed to
track the machines through the use of dedicated server that ping the machine to
discover its whereabouts.

3.2 Absolute Software – AbsoluteTrack (AbsoluteSoftware 2006a)
This tool again requires a dedicated server to track the notebook computer.
This application however uses the BIOS as its repository for the application
that reports to the server. While this implementation is more robust and the
application is likely to remain on the machine it still does not address the need
to connect to the internet. If the machine never connects to the internet it is of
little use as a tracking application.

3.3 Absolute Software – Computrace LoJack for Laptops
(AbsoluteSoftware 2006b)
This application is installed on a notebook computer and constantly pings a
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server to verify its locations. If the notebook computer is stolen and
reconnected to the internet the server already knows that it needs to start
tracking of the notebook computer. A secret email is sent to the server
containing information such as the IP address, the ISP through which it is
connected and potentially other information. One interesting feature is that the
software is stored in the HPA/DCO which would allow it to remain on the hard
disk even in the event that the target notebook computer is reformatted.
While these tools circumvent the identification process all together by tracking
the whereabouts of the machine itself and notifying the law enforcement where
it is at any given time to be able to recover the machine, they how ever do not
address the issue of a person removing the software of the machine or never
connecting to the internet to allow the machine to report to the tracking server.
Should the machine then get recovered by the law enforcement, no identifiable
information would be found on the
4. THIS RESEARCH
After a review of needs and existing tools, research questions answered here
are thus:
What types of non-volatile storage areas exist within a notebook computer
running a Windows XP Operating System?
This includes examining traditional non-volatile memories such as the Basic
Input Output System (BIOS), Master Boot Record (MBR) and hidden partitions,
but the research will look further to identify locations such as the advanced
configuration and power interface (ACPI) and other potential locations.
Is it possible to write to these storage areas?
Once identified, we attempt to write to these storage areas, either through the
utilisation of third party tools, or if not available, with custom designed tools
and processes.
Which storage location can hold enough data to uniquely identify a
notebook computer?
Once the first two questions were answered, enough information was provided to
successfully answer the third question. Three key criteria were addressed in
order for the storage to be considered, these criteria have been outlined below.


Storage has enough unallocated space



Storage can be written to



Storage maintains persistent state

The criteria addressed the need for the storage capacity, the ability of the storage
to hold enough data to successfully identify a notebook computer and
persistence; to remain after power downs, reformats and hardware exchanges.
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Only when all three criteria were satisfied, have the non-volatile storage
locations been considered suitable for the storing of notebook computer
identification information.
5. STORAGE LOCATIONS
There are several areas in a notebook computer that might be used a storage
areas that are potentially non-volatile in nature and capable of holding
information as suggested by Slay et al. (2004).

5.1 Master Boot Record (MBR)
The MBR is the data structure created on a hard disk when the first partition is
created. It is located at cylinder 0 head 0 sector 1 and contains the boot code to run
the partition (NTFS.COM 2006). The location of the MBR as the information
above suggests is located at the start of the hard disk. The first 63 sectors of any
hard disk are reserved for the MBR code. A snap shot of the complete MBR is
shown in Figure 1, which shows the address range of the MBR code.
It is clearly visible that the boot code only takes up the first sector of the MBR.
This leaves 62 remaining sectors that are reserved on the hard disk but remain
unused (ranish.com 1998). FDISK is a tool used to create and format the MBR.
FDISK is a MS-DOS command that was developed by Microsoft to allow the
forming of hard disks (Microsoft 2005). After examining the tool is was evident
that it did not modify the MBR but rather remove and insert a fresh copy. The
reading and writing feature however is a valuable function that needs to be
examined during the experimentation stage.

Figure 1: Snapshot of MBR boot code/first sector
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5.2 Basic Input Output System (BIOS)
The BIOS is software that is stored on Read Only (ROM) chips. More recently
it has been stored on flash memory. The BIOS software defines the capabilities
of the system and what type of hardware is connected to it. Depending on the
BIOS manufacturer, the size of the software residing on the ROM chip ranges
from 256 KB to 1 MB. The test machine is an Award type BIOS and thus has
512 KB sized software. There are several tools, such as AwardFlash, WinFlash
and AMI Flash that update the BIOS (eSupport.com 2004). These tools
however cannot update the image of the BIOS but rather delete the original and
replace it with a new version. A free open source version called UniFlash (Zary
2005) was discovered. This tool allowed the flashing of any type of BIOS
regardless of its manufacturer. This tool will be used to attempt the flashing of
the BIOS image to conduct further experiments on it.

5.3 Advanced Configuration and Power Interface (ACPI)
The ACPI is an open industry specification co-developed by Hewlett-Packard,
Intel, Microsoft, Phoenix, and Toshiba (Hewlett-Packard et al. 1999). It is an
integral part of the OS; it manages all the power distribution to the computer’s
devices. If a device is unused, then power can be turned off to reduce power
consumption (TheFreeDictionary.com 2005). The ACPI is comprised of an
AML code. The code is stored in APCI Registers or APCI Tables; these however
are relatively small in size and allow only the storing of code and no other data
(Hewlett-Packard et al. 2004). It is possible to overwrite the APCI code in certain
locations to perform a task in a different manner than its intended use, but this
option is of little use (Heasman 2006). Due to this restriction it is unlikely to hold
the marker for notebook computer identification.

5.4 Host Protected Area/Device Control Overlay (HPA/DCO)
The HPA and the DCO are areas on certain hard disks, which are usually
located at the end of a hard disk. The OS is unable to see these areas and can
only recognise the size of the hard disk through calling a READ NATIVE
MAX ADDRESS. If the HPA or DCO are set to be 4 GB in size out of a 400
GB hard disk, the hard disk would appear to the OS as 396 GB big. Another
command call that can be used on HPAs is SET MAX ADDRESS. This call
would allow someone to increase the size of the HPA and hide data in it
(Gupta, Hoeschele & Rogers 2006). Hard disk utilising HPA/DCO at present
are usually using them to hide data on them, mainly for system restoration. The
HPA and DCO make the location a valid potential storage area without any
size restrictions. One problem however does present itself, in that there is no
guarantee that the HPA or DCO will be available on any and every hard disk a
notebook computer is shipped with. Unlike the MBR and the BIOS the HPA
and DCO are not integral parts of the system. Due to this inconsistency the
HPA/DCO will not be researched further.
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5.5 Hidden Partitions
Hidden partitions are a more traditional storage area option, which are more
often used to store restore points and OS files to facilitate safe restoring of
corrupt OS’s. A primary partition can be created using FDISK and then further
subdivisions of the primary partitions can be made. Partitions such as extended
partition or logical drives can be created (Microsoft 2005). If a partition is
hidden it is not detectable by the operating system; this means that creating a
minimum sized hidden partition will allow storing any identification
information, and raising no suspicion with chunks of the hard disk missing.
Using GDISK, part of Symantec Norton Ghost allows the user to use GDISK
just like FDISK but with the added feature to create a hidden partition
(Symantec 2006). One problem however is raised, should the entire hard disk
be formatted the hidden partition will be along with the primary and any other
partitions on the hard disk formatted. Thus this option is not well suited for
persistent storage areas that would hold identification information.
6. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

6.1 Methods of Storing and Retrieving Data
As stated above, the way in which the identifier can be stored is dependent on
the storage medium. The different approaches to inserting data have been
described in the following subsections.

6.2 Master Boot Record (MBR)
A literature review discovered that the MBR record is located on the hard disk
and more specifically at the beginning of the memory address range of the hard
disk. Thus the first 63 sectors of the hard disk are reserved for the boot loader
code. The boot code requires only one of the 63 sectors and therefore the
remaining 62 sectors remain reserved and unallocated. In order to store the
marker into the unallocated sectors FDISK was considered. FDISK is a “diskpartitioning program used in DOS and several other operating systems to create
the master boot record and allocate partitions for the operating system's use”
(DataRecovery 2006). There are several free tools such as XFDISK (Boeck
2004) or MBRWizard (Layton 2003) out on the internet as well as commercial
tools such as Super FDISK (PTDD-Soft 2005) or Partition Magic (Symantec
1998) on the market that offer FDISK-like features that allow the formatting of
the MBR but rarely any allow the modification of the boot code itself. Once a
tool was discovered, the source code of the identified tool called FDISK 1.21
(Reifsnyder 2001) was used to firstly understand the techniques applied when
writing to and reading from the hard disk in order to be able to perform the
desired functions of the custom tool. Custom code was written to extract the
MBR image, as well as to modify the location of the boot code identified as
storage area, and to store it back onto the hard disk.
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The first part of the custom code was to call C libraries which have direct access
to the hard disk. The BIOS.H library allows the reading or writing of 512 bytes
at a time from a sector of the hard disk. Since, for the purpose of this research,
the location of the MBR is always the same on any hard disk, it was possible to
extract the first sector and store it into a 512 byte sized array to store the marker
and write it back in using the before mentioned library’s write function. If the
marker needs to be stored into other sectors, the tool would read in further
sectors store the data in them and write them out back onto the hard disk.
The second part of the application was to use the 512 bytes and modify the
memory location where the marker is to be stored. This was done using
standard C libraries.
Figure 2 shows the location on the MBR where the marker was stored. While
only a 28 digit code was stored for testing purposes, no problems were
encountered during the storing of larger markers to the remaining 62 sectors.
To summarise the processes performed:


Load test machine into DOS and run custom code



Extract the MBR image from hard disk using custom code



Using custom written code modify MBR image



Reinsert the MBR image onto the hard disk using custom code



Restart System, test MBR operation, success if OS loading

Figure 2: Master Boot Record screenshot circled area indicates stored marker
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6.3 Basic Input Output System (BIOS)
The supporting documentation supplied by the manufacturers of different
BIOS’s indicate that, for each BIOS manufacturer, there is also a custom tool
that performs the updating of the BIOS (eSupport.com 2004) To be able to
make use of these tools to attempt the modification of the BIOS rather than the
complete update, it was necessary to completely understand the techniques and
the processes involved. The large number of different BIOS manufactures
meant that there would also be countless flashing tools, and that meant that it
was not possible to pursue this approach. After an extensive online search, an
open source, universal, Pascal based BIOS flashing tool called UniFlash (Zary
2005) that was capable of extracting and reinserting a BIOS image onto the
CMOS Chip was discovered. While this tool was not able to modify the BIOS
image itself, it did allow the extraction of any type of BIOS image. Since the
image itself was simply a binary text file, it was possible to modify it with a
standard hex editor. Furthermore, to refrain from using too many third party
tools/applications, a small C based program was developed to access this
image and add the marker to a specified location in the image. Due to the size
of the BIOS being approximately 512 KB, it was not possible to load a single
array with the image content like in the case of the MBR, but rather a
temporary array that would load 512 bytes at the time until the area identified
as the storage location for the marker was reached, modified and once again
stored into the original image for reinsertion to the CMOS Chip. Once the
marker has been successfully stored in the image, the universal tool reinserted
the image into the Chip. Figure 3 shows the BIOS image and the marker stored
within it. To ensure that the BIOS was still functioning the test system was
restarted and observed. The system booted into the OS without any
complications indicating that the change to the image resulted in no abnormal
functionality.
To summarise the processes performed:


Load test machine into DOS and run custom uniflash



Extract the BIOS image from the CMOS chip using custom uniflash
tool



Using custom written code modify BIOS image



Reinsert the BIOS image onto the chip using custom UniFlash tool



Restart System, test BIOS operation, success if OS loading
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Figure 3: BIOS screenshot circled area shows the stored marker.
7. EVALUATION

7.1 Master Boot Record (MBR)
The Master Boot Record fully addresses the identified set of criteria which will
fully determine whether the non-volatile memory is to be chosen as a valid
location for the storing of the marker. It successfully addressed storage size, by
discovering that there is approximately 31 KB of unallocated space, the
location can be written to as proven in the testing stage and also that it
maintained persistent state after extensive testing by extracting the MBR image
and checking that the marker was still in the location it was stored in and that it
was not modified. Thus the Master Boot Record was shown to be a valid nonvolatile storage location for safe storing of notebook computer identification
information.

7.2 Basic Input Output System (BIOS)
The BIOS was a more complicated non-volatile memory to consider as a
location capable of storing markers. Due to the number of different BIOS
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manufacturers, it is difficult to test all types and confirm them as a valid
storage location. As a proof of concept, analysis of a test machine’s Award
BIOS was sufficient enough to at least proof that it was possible to successfully
store a marker onto the CMOS chip.
In answering the first question, “What types of non-volatile storage areas exist
within a notebook computer running a Windows XP Operating System?”, the
BIOS was identified as a non-volatile memory and in answering our second
research question, “Is it possible to write to these storage areas?”, we showed
that it was possible to write to the BIOS image rather then just removing one
version of the image and storing a new version all together. Question three,
“Which storage location can hold enough data to uniquely identify a notebook
computer?”, with similar results to the MBR, was shown as a valid non-volatile
storage by modifying the BIOS image and restarting the test machine, running
it for a set period of time and extracting the image out of the CMOS chip again.
Verification could then be achieved by verifying that the marker did not change
in location or size.
The results of the BIOS testing stage were tested against the set selection
criteria, which consisted of the following: storage has enough unallocated
space, storage can be written to and storage maintains persistent state, and the
BIOS implementation was found to be a non-volatile memory that has enough
sufficient amount of unallocated space to which the marker can be written to.
This was discovered through the literature review and the testing stage and the
total amount of unallocated space in the Award BIOS was found to be roughly
64 KB of space. The second selection criterion was successfully addressed as
mentioned previously by writing to the BIOS image and reinserting it on to the
CMOS chip. And the third criterion was addressed and said before by writing
to the BIOS and running the system to test for anomalies and at the same time
test the possibility of the marker of being modified or removed from the BIOS.
After several restarts the contents of the BIOS image did not change including
the location and size of the stored marker. Thus the BIOS was found to be a
valid non-volatile storage location capable of storing notebook information.
8. PROOF OF CONCEPT APPLICATION
By implementing the identified non-volatile storage areas and using the unique
marker, notebook computer identification can be achieved by formulating a
concept tool and applying these features. This tool, would trough a number of
other tools also generated for the concept tool allow the identification of a
notebook computer to its owner. The steps and tools involved in this process
are illustrated below in Figure 4.
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Client

Notify owner
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machine

Use ID information
to discover owner
of the machine

Law
Enforcement

Run Verify
Tool
Verify
Machine
Target Machine
Get unique
marker

Run Laptop ID Tool

Send marker to ID
Repository to get
ID information

Identify
Machine

Store ID
information in ID
Repository

Laptop ID Tool

Verifier
Tool

Generate and return
unique serial number
and password

Send ID
information

Client
Registration
Service

Figure 4: Architectural/procedural overview of the concept application
9. DISCUSSION
Through the literature review, several potential non-volatile storage area
locations were identified. Further research on the individual storage areas
resulted in identifying that the storage areas are capable of holding the
identification data, that they can be written to and that these areas are persistent
in state. Therefore, any data stored in such areas would remain there even after
the target notebook computer is shut down. These requirements greatly reduced
the number from those initially proposed to only the MBR and the BIOS.
After extensive research, it became evident that should these memories be used
to store information about a notebook computer in conjunction with a forensic
tool, several issues needed addressing. There were some limitations both to the
storage locations and the concept tools that were designed.

9.1 Limitations in Non-volatile Storage area locations
The two identified non-volatile storage area locations that conform to the set
criteria have a number of limitations that potentially introduce new issues that
need to be addressed before they can be used in a forensic application. Firstly
the nature of the storage area areas, at least in the case of the BIOS, means that
there will be regular updates to BIOS boot code. These updates would result in
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the flashing of the BIOS image with the stored marker being lost and re-flashed
with a newer version. While these updates are not frequent, and most users do
not perform such updates unless a major fault was discovered by the
manufacturer, and the owner is instructed to perform these updates, it is still
necessary to address this problem. One further limitation affecting the MBR in
particular is the use of Windows FDISK feature “/mbr” when formatting a hard
drive. While this feature is not part of a standard reformat, it can however be
used to format the MBR as well. This presents a problem to the safety of the
marker stored in the MBR. This also would need to be addressed if future
research is to be conducted.

9.2 Forensic Soundness of Proof-of-Concept Application
Due to the current implementation of the marker in the MBR and the BIOS,
there are no mechanisms in place to prevent a person with the right knowledge
from removing the marker from the BIOS or MBR. This, however, has been
stated as necessary future research. As a concept tool, this application has not
been tested against guidelines for forensic tool development, and while no
changes have been recorded to the state of the target machine during an
investigation, no forensically sound methods were applied to verify these
outcomes. Future work may address this as a potential issue. Once these
problems have been addressed the tool is potentially of immense benefit to the
forensic community and also my increase the return rate of recovered notebook
computers.

9.3 Feasibility of a Universal Software Application
As discussed in the literature review, the problem of notebook computer
identification is a growing concern for the law enforcement. While the number
of recovered notebook computers increases the lack of uniquely identifiable
markers on these machine makes the task of returning the machine to their
owners impossible, leaving the law enforcement with room full of unclaimed
machines. Being able to provide a tool that will not only enable police to
identify the machines to their owners but also speed up this identification
process makes this concept a promising area of research.
The tools discussed, compared with the proof of concept application, appear
quite dissimilar. The concept application focuses on the identification of the
machine, so that when it is recovered by the law enforcement, it can be
returned to its rightful owner. The commercial applications focus more on the
tracking of the machine through the use of a tracking server and the encryption
of the data stored on the machine. The commercial applications are focusing
solely on the commercial or corporate sector where the data is valuable but not
the hardware. The concept application is targeting users who use the notebook
computers for private use. This should allow the tool if commercialised to be a
leader in the market.
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10. CONCLUSION
This research identified several valid locations in which it is possible to store
the marker to uniquely identify a notebook computer. As stated above, we have
also through a literature review discovered the storage area locations, possibly
non-volatile in nature, that could be used to identify a notebook computer
through safe storage area of unique notebook identification information.
Several types of storage areas were identified, including traditional storage
areas such as hidden files and hidden partitions as well as non-traditional
potential storage areas like the ACPI, HPA, DCO, as well as the BIOS and the
MBR. Due to the nature of some of these non-volatile potential storage areas,
this research indicated that they were unlikely to hold enough data if any for
notebook identification. Regarding the traditional storage areas such as hidden
files and the hidden partitions, a simple hard disk format would have removed
these without any problem, making these a useless option. This narrowed the
list of possible storage areas to only the MBR and the BIOS. We then focused
on these two locations to test these against identified criteria. During the
evaluation stage of the research, the two storage areas were tested and found to
satisfy firstly that the storage can hold enough data to uniquely identify the
notebook computer, secondly that the storage can be written to and lastly that
the storage can maintain its state even after power downs. These locations
have also been shown not to be erasable through conventional means and
require direct and advanced interaction to remove the marker. This requires the
person to know exactly where the marker is and the methods that would
remove the markers.

10.1 Future Directions
This project resulted in the design of a proof-of-concept tool to prove the
feasibility of the use of non-volatile storage areas as locations that would hold
the marker to uniquely identify a notebook computer. This tool successfully
stored information to the identified locations but did not incorporate fail safes
against purposeful or accidental deletion of the markers. Both the BIOS and the
MBR possess a checksum that is run every time the notebook computer is
booted to test for malicious code in the respective locations. These checksums
would need modification to incorporate the stored marker as an integral part of
the BIOS without which the OS could not load. Thus any purposeful attempts
to remove the marker would result in rendering the OS unusable. Furthermore
the software designed has potential use in forensic investigations and as such it
needs to be forensically sound. It needs to be tested against accepted standards
for the design and development of a forensically sound tool.
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